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NIE 100-4-57

9 July 1957

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Nº 340

**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 100-4-57**

(Supersedes NIE 100-5-55)

**IMPLICATIONS OF GROWING NUCLEAR
CAPABILITIES FOR THE COMMUNIST
BLOC AND THE FREE WORLD**

Submitted by the

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IMPLICATIONS OF GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES FOR THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE FREE WORLD

THE PROBLEM

To assess the steps being taken in Communist and non-Communist countries to acquaint the people with the implications of nuclear warfare; and to estimate: (a) the effects over time on human attitudes and behavior in foreign countries of a growing awareness of growing capabilities for mutual annihilation in the event of nuclear war; (b) the probable attitudes of people in foreign nations toward the initiation of general war by the constituted leaders of nations, or members of power blocs, possessing mutually destructive technological capability; and (c) the effects of growing nuclear capabilities on the policies of Communist and non-Communist states.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In the non-Communist world there is public fear of biological effects of tests and of the consequences of nuclear war. Consequently, there is strong popular pressure for banning tests, and a strong and growing opposition to the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, there is a belief, most advanced in informed and government circles in Western Europe, that possession of nuclear weapons is essential for defense or to enhance national prestige. (*Paras. 8-18*)

2. Although the threat of nuclear destruction has increased desires for neutrality in some countries, the predominant effect in the NATO area thus far has been to reinforce belief in the need for

mutual security efforts backed by the deterrent force of the US. Confidence in western deterrents has served to prevent any material increase in the susceptibility of non-Communist governments and people to Soviet threats. Nevertheless, the unprecedented prospect of total destruction in general war has tended to make governments more hesitant to pursue policies involving risk of war with the USSR. (*Paras. 28-32*)

3. Future developments in weapons delivery systems may greatly increase popular sensitivity to the nuclear threat, and will almost certainly accentuate present tendencies in the western world to caution and compromise in international relations. The USSR will combine threats

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and inducements in an attempt to exploit this situation and to undermine western alliances and the will to resist. Over the longer run such efforts might have some success. We believe it more likely, however, that the governments and peoples of the NATO area will continue to recognize that the threat of war can best be limited and their security enhanced through adherence to the western alliance system. (*Paras. 41-44*)

4. The increasing awareness of the destructiveness of nuclear war has probably increased the chances in both Western ✓ Europe and Japan of an almost instinctive effort to stand aside in the event that the US and the USSR appeared to them to be on the verge of war, particularly if important European or Japanese interests were not directly involved. If time were available, as would be unlikely in the event of a surprise Soviet attack or in the event of a fast moving crisis in Europe itself, and if neutrality appeared to be feasible, some NATO governments might take whatever steps they could to keep out of the war. (*Paras. 45-46*)

5. We believe that both the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders recognize the US capability to conduct effective and devastating nuclear warfare against the Bloc, and therefore desire to avoid general war. They would not be deterred, how-

ever, from military action such as the Hungarian intervention to maintain control over territories presently held by the Bloc. Nor would they be deterred from local aggression under circumstances in which they were confident that the West would not react in ways involving major risks of general war. They may believe that future increases in Soviet nuclear capabilities will further reduce the chances that the Western response will be such as to involve such risks. In the near-term future however, it is likely that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will continue to abstain from local aggression of the Korean or Indochinese type because of fear that the US might intervene and use nuclear weapons locally and thereby defeat the aggression or require expansion of the warfare by the USSR. (*Paras. 34-35*)

6. The USSR would be seriously concerned about the development of an increasing nuclear capability in Western Europe, and might even make explicit threats to discourage the stationing of IRBM's on the continent or the development of a combined nuclear capability in Western Europe. However, we believe that it would not attack to prevent these developments, continuing to fear US retaliation, and that its basic response would be an intensification of its own arms build-up. (*Paras. 36-39*)

DISCUSSION

I. THE EFFECTS OF GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ON POPULAR ATTITUDES

7. Few governments in the non-Communist world have made systematic efforts to provide their people with reliable or detailed information of the effects of nuclear weapons.

Most non-Communist governments appear to believe that it is impossible to develop an effective defense against nuclear attack. In this situation they have been unwilling to spend much money on civil defense programs or to accept the possible risks of creating additional popular fears by laying before the

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public the facts about nuclear weapons. The major exceptions are Sweden and, to a lesser extent, the UK, where the governments have taken the lead, through civil defense agencies and public statements, in providing the people with information concerning the effects of nuclear weapons. In the USSR and the Satellites a carefully controlled release of information, designed to support a nuclear civil defense program, has been underway since 1954.¹

8. Despite the general lack of deliberate government efforts to foster greater understanding of the nuclear situation, it is likely that the public in much of the non-Communist world has developed fairly accurate general knowledge regarding the possible consequences of nuclear warfare. In areas other than the UK and Sweden where there has been much informed debate, public understanding or knowledge of detailed aspects of nuclear effects and of the complicated problems posed by nuclear developments is largely dependent on the content of popular media. Such sources have carried an increasing body of information and comment on the nuclear situation, some of which is reliable and some of which is biased, subjective, or even patently dishonest.

9. In any event a number of specific developments over the past year have served to stimulate popular concern, to increase the flow of information concerning the nuclear situation, and to bring nuclear problems increasingly before the public as immediate issues of national policy. Most recently the British thermonuclear tests added new impetus to a worldwide debate on the biological effects of radioactive fallout. The British White Paper dramatically drew attention to a wide range of implications of nuclear weapons, including the destructive effects and the limitations of the defense and began a new debate on strategy that promises to continue for many months. The publicity accorded the development of advanced weapons and delivery systems and public statements and debates throughout the free world about fallout

dangers have also centered public attention on the risks of nuclear operations. The various warning notes dispatched by the USSR served to underline the destructive possibilities of nuclear war and in combination with other developments brought sharply before the public such questions as the desirability of possession of nuclear weapons and the relative advantages of alliance and neutrality. As a result of these developments, public awareness and understanding not only of the physical effects, but also of the biological, political, strategic, and economic implications of nuclear weapons have probably increased considerably in the non-Communist world.

10. Popular reaction in the non-Communist world to growing nuclear capabilities is most definitely manifested in strong and growing opposition to the testing, manufacture, and use of nuclear weapons. The recent vigorous opposition to the testing of nuclear weapons appears to be more directly related to the immediate concern over possible biological effects than to the more general fear of a future nuclear war. Marked apprehensions exist among the people of Western Europe and to an intense degree in Japan that harmful concentrations of radioactive materials are already being absorbed by plant and animal life. These apprehensions are in many cases supported by the findings of some reputable scientists, and will probably result in increasing pressure on governments to ban testing even outside the context of a general disarmament agreement. These attitudes toward testing and production, together with the general fear of nuclear war, are creating a growing pressure for progress toward disarmament among the great powers. The Communists are vigorously exploiting this situation.

11. Apart from the foregoing and a growth in the fear of the consequences of war, there are few clear popular attitudes on the problems posed by growing nuclear capabilities. Even the "ban the bomb" sentiment is tempered by a belief, particularly within informed circles in Western Europe, that in present circumstances nuclear weapons in Western hands are essential to deter Soviet aggression

¹ See Annex A for a more detailed discussion of government familiarization programs.

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and to discourage pressure or blackmail. There is also a growing tendency among Western European countries to believe that possession of nuclear capabilities is a necessary attribute of national security, prestige, or both. At present, these trends in opinion are most evident in the UK, France, and Sweden. The British program of developing nuclear capabilities has been supported by both major parties and the general public. Public support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons is growing in France. In Sweden all parties, except the Communists, advocate domestic production of these weapons. These sentiments are likely to become more widespread but might be checked if nuclear weapons are limited by effective international control.²

12. Popular opinion in West Germany is now strongly opposed to domestic production of nuclear weapons; in recent months it has become nearly as strongly opposed to the equipment of German forces with nuclear weapons, as well as to the provision of such weapons to allied forces in Germany. Many Germans feel that the acquisition of nuclear capabilities would end all hope of localizing and limiting any conflict that might develop in East Germany or Berlin and that it might constitute an additional obstacle to reunification. On the other hand, there is some support for Adenauer's position that NATO and West Germany should have both conventional and nuclear capabilities on the grounds that national security and national prestige require German forces to be equipped with the best weapons obtainable. Discussion of the issue has been intensified by the current election campaign, but a clear test of popular attitudes is not likely at the polls in September.

13. Public opinion in Japan remains strongly opposed to the entry of US nuclear weapons and would not at this time permit the government to undertake any serious efforts to develop its own nuclear weapons.

14. Although the developing nuclear situation has greatly increased the fear of the consequences of war, the popular view is that the

chances of general war are no greater, and may be less, than in the prenuclear era. In fact, because the consequences of general war now appear so totally disastrous, there is a widespread tendency to discount its possibility. Nevertheless, the public strongly desires to minimize all risks, and pressures are exerted against adoption of measures involving risk of war.

15. In Western Europe, nuclear developments have raised serious doubts among the public as to the possibility of defense or survival in the event of general war. This has given impetus to pacifist and third force thinking. There has also been some public pressure for disarmament and relaxation of tensions, often without critical regard for the consequences. Nevertheless, most evidence indicates that Europeans do not believe they can dispense with a unified approach to security. The fear, previously widespread among Europeans, that the US might provoke general war by trigger-happy or inflexible policies appears to have declined, and there continues to be recognition that the security of Europe depends primarily on the deterrent effect of US nuclear power. If, however, this deterrent power should appear to be losing its effect, the underlying fear of the USSR and of war might come to the surface and alter existing national policies.

16. Japan represents a special case in that public preoccupation with the horrors of nuclear war combined with a popular hope that neutrality will enable Japan to avoid destruction has reinforced popular pressures for the withdrawal of US forces and a modification of the existing defense agreement. However, these views are offset to some extent by the belief in influential circles that Japan needs the protective cover of US power.

17. Nuclear developments do not appear to have played a significant role in local attitudes towards SEATO or the Baghdad Pact. In the neutralist states, and particularly in India, nuclear developments have only served to reinforce the desire to stand apart from alliance systems.

18. It is difficult to discern any clear-cut public attitudes toward the relationship be-

² See NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries—Likelihood and Consequences, 18 June 1957.

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tween the existence of a nuclear stalemate and the likelihood of local wars. People appear to hope that if local wars occur, they can be fought with conventional weapons, but doubt that they will if important interests of the two great nuclear powers are involved. They appear to believe that the use of nuclear weapons in such a situation would add greatly to the chances of the war becoming general, and they are not comforted by distinctions between "tactical" or "strategic" use or by the British idea of "graduated deterrence."

In the Bloc

19. In the USSR it is almost certain that the top leadership has an understanding of the possible effects of general nuclear war and a general appreciation of the problems of defense. It is likely that some of this knowledge has by now filtered down to substantial numbers of responsible party officials, bureaucrats, military personnel, and intellectuals. The general population has been told no more than that hydrogen bombs are "several times" more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb and that radioactive fallout presents some dangers. However, the general public has been assured that although nuclear weapons in the hands of the "imperialists" are a serious threat, the USSR is so strong that any aggressor would invite extinction. Malenkov's statement in 1954 to the effect that nuclear war would mean destruction of all civilization was not played up to domestic audiences, and was in effect repudiated by other leaders. The people are frequently exposed to the accepted line that nuclear war would result in the destruction of capitalism and victory for the "forces of socialism and peace," even though it is admitted that the costs of nuclear war would be very great in all countries.

20. In the Eastern European Satellites, probably only the top military and political leaders have an adequate understanding of the changes that nuclear weapons have brought to modern warfare. Even more than in the USSR, Satellite domestic propaganda except in East Germany has minimized the destructive power of atomic weapons, and provided almost no information about hydrogen weap-

ons. General public knowledge of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons is nevertheless probably at no lower level than in the USSR since at least Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are known to have undertaken extensive civil defense training programs, and in most of the Satellites Western information is somewhat more accessible than in the USSR.

21. In Communist China the top leadership probably has acquired reliable, if not complete, information on nuclear developments. However, an understanding of the changes that nuclear weapons have brought to modern warfare probably does not extend beyond military staffs, upper echelons of the party, and elements of the urban intelligentsia. Although the leadership almost certainly believes that the US has the capability to destroy much of Communist China's modern industry, they have stated, and may believe, that China's large area and agrarian economy make the country less vulnerable than the US to nuclear attack. In support of Communist "ban the bombs" drives, the population of Communist China has been exposed to considerable propaganda concerning US nuclear policies. However, little specific information concerning nuclear weapons has been made available and it is likely that the mass of the population is largely unaware of the possible effects of nuclear warfare.

II. THE EFFECTS OF GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ON GOVERNMENT POLICIES

In the Non-Communist World

22. Except in the case of certain specific developments in the area of defense policy, it is difficult to isolate and weigh precisely the influence of nuclear weapons developments on government policy. Many of the elements in the postwar world situation — the fundamental incompatibility of Communist and free world objectives, the reduced power position of Western Europe as compared with the US and the USSR, and the postwar emergence of nationalist and neutralist forces in the former colonial areas — would have existed with or without nuclear weapons. In many other

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cases, the existence of nuclear weapons is but one of a number of ingredients entering into the formulations of governmental attitudes and policies.

23. Governments and peoples have been slow to realize the full implications of the nuclear weapons situation, and the process of formulating new policies to cope with the changing situation is still in the early stages. This process is complicated by the very rapidity of technological developments in the nuclear weapons field, which leaves human comprehension and governmental policy in a continuing state of uncertainty and confusion with respect to the possibilities and requirements of the nuclear era. However, the primary fact about nuclear weapons — that they enormously increase the potential destructiveness of wars — is clear to all governments. Also clear is the fact that military power is concentrated in the hands of two states.

24. Since the rise of the USSR as a nuclear power, possibly the most important over-all effect of the nuclear weapons situation on national policies of most non-Communist nations has been to diminish popular and official willingness to pursue policies involving danger of war with the Bloc. For example, we believe that the British and French decision to withdraw from the Suez operation was partly influenced by concern over possible military involvement with the USSR. This trend has contributed to the tendency, particularly in Europe, to define more narrowly those interests considered vital.

25. The nuclear situation, and particularly the growing capability of the USSR to launch highly devastating attacks, even against the US, is having profound effects on the military policies of European states. The admission of the British White Paper on Defense that "there is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack with nuclear weapons" and its conclusion that the UK must develop its own nuclear deterrent if it is to continue an independent national existence have served to intensify the public discussion of some of the problems involved.

26. Some of the reasons for the British decision to cut investments in conventional forces and to concentrate on deterrent striking power were domestic, i.e., the political advantages to be derived from promises that defense costs could be reduced and conscription terminated. Of equal or greater importance, however, was the reaction against the situation in which the security of the UK, like that of all other non-Communist powers, depends preponderantly on the US. British leaders probably do not envisage the development of such nuclear capabilities as would free them entirely from reliance on the US, but they would like to develop them enough to increase their influence within the alliance and elsewhere. In addition, there has been present an element of concern that the US will gradually withdraw its forces from Europe and, as Soviet capabilities against the US increase, become less willing to employ its full force against the USSR in the event of Soviet attacks in Europe.

27. Similar considerations have occasioned a gradual change in the attitudes of the governments of Western Europe towards the possession and use of nuclear weapons. The predisposition among Western European governments against the use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts has been rapidly losing ground to the view that the West cannot hope to match Soviet conventional forces and that tactical nuclear weapons are necessary for any modern military force. The opportunity to obtain dual-purpose weapons (weapons capable of being used with either conventional or nuclear warheads) has in general been welcomed by European governments. France in particular, has drawn up plans for the reorganization of its armed forces in anticipation of the introduction of nuclear weapons. While the West German government is avoiding a firm public position pending the September elections, it has tacitly accepted the NATO policy of storing nuclear weapons in Germany for the use of NATO troops and is known to favor the eventual equipment of German forces with tactical atomic weapons. The introduction of nuclear weapons is a more delicate matter in Norway and Denmark. The Danish government has declared it will not

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now accept nuclear warheads on its territory; Norway made their acceptance dependent on parliamentary approval.

28. The process of adjusting individual and NATO strategies to the developing nuclear situation is placing some strains on the alliance. Serious problems, including the issues of acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons, disarmament and German unification, and the proper balance of conventional and nuclear forces will continue to complicate allied unity. Events in Hungary have weakened Western European confidence in the determination of the US to assume serious risks of Soviet counteraction, despite relief in many quarters that the US did not make the situation an occasion for a showdown with the USSR. Many Europeans probably feel that over the longer run the US may withdraw from Europe or greatly reduce its forces there and rely almost exclusively on the strategy of long-range nuclear retaliation. This is a basic concern of the French government and also partly accounts for the violent German reaction to rumors that US forces would be withdrawn from Europe.

29. For the moment, however, and probably for some time to come European governments will continue to recognize their need for political solidarity vis-a-vis the Bloc and for a unified defense effort involving the US nuclear deterrent. Although neutrality has genuine emotional appeal in Western Europe and the sentiment has increased recently in the UK it finds little direct reflection in current official policies and has not affected the solidarity of the alliance.

30. Outside of Europe, the pattern of effects on government policies is diverse. The Canadian government recognizes the need for the nuclear deterrent as a stabilizing influence in world affairs, and the Soviet threat has enhanced the closeness of the Canadian alliance with the US.

31. In Japan, nuclear developments have contributed to the desire of the government to modify defense arrangements with the US in order to increase Japanese control over the activities of Japan-based forces. Some gov-

ernment and military leaders are interested in the development of Japanese nuclear capabilities. However, the general fear of and revulsion against militarism and nuclear war dating from the experiences of World War II will retard any change in Japanese government policies concerning nuclear weapons. In deference to Japanese desires, the US has made a commitment to seek Japanese consent before bringing any nuclear weapons into Japan.

32. In India and other neutralist states, nuclear developments have reinforced government efforts to foster international disarmament agreement and arguments against the use of nuclear weapons.

In the Sino-Soviet Bloc

33. We believe that the developing nuclear situation is a major factor in the plans and policies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Soviet leaders understand the destructive nature of nuclear weapons and the problems and prospect of defense. They evidently believe that any large-scale conflict with the US would involve the use of nuclear weapons. Soviet statements have recently warned that it would be difficult to keep small wars small, and Soviet leaders have stated that any local use of nuclear weapons would be likely to lead to general nuclear conflict. While these statements on local war may reflect Soviet doubt as to the possibilities of limiting conflict, they are also designed to have a deterrent and political effect.

34. We believe that both the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders recognize the US capability to conduct effective and devastating nuclear warfare against the Bloc, and therefore desire to avoid general war. They would not be deterred, however, from military action, such as the Hungarian intervention, to maintain control over territories presently held by the Bloc. Nor would they be deterred from local aggression under circumstances in which they were confident that the West would not react in ways involving major risks of general war. They may believe that future increases in Soviet nuclear capabilities will further reduce the chances that the Western response

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will be such as to involve such risks. In the near-term future it is more likely that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will continue to abstain from local aggression of the Korean or Indo-chinese type because of fear that the US might intervene and use nuclear weapons locally and thereby defeat the aggression or require expansion of the warfare by the USSR.

35. If local conflicts do nevertheless occur Bloc powers probably would refrain from taking the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons, hoping thereby to reduce the chances of expanded conflict and to place the onus for such use on the West. If the US initiated the use of nuclear weapons in a local conflict, the USSR would not necessarily conclude that the US intended to expand the conflict without limit. The USSR might then believe that it could respond with nuclear weapons in the same local area of conflict without forcing an expansion of the conflict into general war. The USSR would recognize, however, that use of nuclear weapons by both sides would sharply increase the chances of the local conflict spreading into general war.

36. Soviet policy since 1953 has increasingly reflected an appreciation of the dangers to the USSR of nuclear warfare and the desire to avoid it. The desire to reduce the risk of nuclear war has, since Stalin's death, been one of the important factors underlying Soviet efforts to reduce international tensions. Concurrently, the Soviet leaders have sought to avoid any appearance of weakness, any agreement which would endanger their predominant military position in Eurasia, and any stabilization which would hinder the expansion of Soviet influence through political and economic means. They have continued to reorganize and adjust their armed forces for nuclear warfare. In order to counter the growing US nuclear capability, they have undertaken a continuing buildup of their nuclear delivery and air defense capabilities.

37. The Soviet leaders were aware of the general direction of Western defense policy before the British White Paper was published, but the more recent developments pointing to the West's increasing reliance upon and expansion of its nuclear power have evidently

sharpened their concern. This has been reflected in a fresh round of Soviet warnings to numerous powers urging that to permit the basing of nuclear weapons could only lead to national destruction in the event of war. However, the USSR has not threatened any specific reaction to the precise act of accepting nuclear weapons.

38. Barring the conclusion of a comprehensive disarmament agreement, a greater nuclear threat to the USSR will develop in the future, not only in terms of the destructive explosive tonnage which can be inflicted on the USSR, but in terms of the speed with which it can be delivered and the inadequacy of prospective air defense systems to cope with the delivery vehicles. The Soviet leaders almost certainly estimate that within a few years IRBM's will be deployed within range of important Soviet targets. We believe that this development will disturb the Soviet leaders profoundly. They will conduct a vigorous diplomatic and propaganda campaign to prevent it, possibly even including explicit threats of force against countries stationing such weapons in their territory. However, they will probably recognize that they could not intervene by actual use of force, in Western Europe and in most other places, despite a substantial parallel development in their own capabilities, without running grave risks of actually provoking general war which we believe the USSR desires to avoid.

39. The USSR almost certainly desires to reduce the burden of the arms race and may be willing to accept a degree of inspection and control previously unacceptable to it. However, we believe that the implications of growing nuclear capabilities are not likely in themselves to cause the USSR to accept the kind of control and inspection system essential to an effective comprehensive disarmament agreement.

III. PROBABLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

40. If present trends continue, and there is no comprehensive disarmament agreement, nuclear weapons of varying types and sizes and supersonic nuclear weapons delivery systems will become standard equipment, not

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only in the US, the UK, and the USSR, but to some degree in most of the advanced industrial nations of the world. Much of the world will live under the threat of nearly instantaneous destruction.

41. Populations and governments may become inured to the threat, like people living on the side of a volcano. New rules for international conduct, tacitly accepted by the great powers, may be developed to avoid direct clashes of interests or pressing for advantage in areas where interests are less clearly defined. Alliances may remain relatively firm and steady as recognized shields against blackmail and coercion.

42. An association of Western European states could probably develop substantial nuclear capabilities within 10 years. Such an association could become a third center of world power, friendly to, but independent of the US.³

43. Another possible development over the longer run is a gradual weakening in support for the NATO alliance without corresponding increases in the military strength of European countries. As weapons continue to multiply and as missile delivery systems advance there may be a great increase in popular sensitivity to the nuclear threat and tremendous pressures, particularly in the non-Communist world, to reach agreement on disarmament and other measures to reduce tension. The USSR, being less restrained by public opinion, might be able to profit by the psychological mood of the non-Communist world and successfully combine threats and inducements to undermine Western alliances and will to resist.

44. Up to now, however, the nuclear power of the USSR and threats involving the use of this power have not in themselves had an adverse effect on Western alliance systems. The threats which have been made against various European powers over the past few years attempt to exploit fears of association with nuclear weapons and suggest that such association will mean extinction in the event of war. Most governments have failed to be affected by these tactics, feeling that the risks of association with the US and the develop-

ment of nuclear capabilities are less than the risks of helpless neutrality. When a particular country develops what it considers a deterrent nuclear capability, its susceptibility to Soviet nuclear threats will probably diminish.

45. These firm attitudes probably conceal major uncertainties, both in the public mind and among political leaders, as to possible and desirable courses of action in the event of imminent general war between the US and the USSR. The increasing awareness of the destructiveness of nuclear war has probably increased the chances of an almost instinctive effort in both Western Europe and Japan to stand aside in the event that the US and the USSR appeared to them to be on the verge of war, particularly if important European or Japanese interests were not directly involved. However, the Western European states would be unlikely to succeed in avoiding involvement in the event that hostilities between the two great powers came suddenly and without warning as the result of a surprise Soviet attack. In this case, the USSR would use any means available to destroy US bases on the continent and in other European and allied areas. European countries would not have time to negotiate the withdrawal of US forces or to declare their neutrality.

46. The situation might be quite different, however, if tensions developed over local incidents, including situations in which the US and the USSR were not initially parties, and if a threat of general war developed more slowly. No NATO state would probably feel obliged, initially at least, to participate if war should break out over Taiwan. On the other hand, if a local conflict should develop in the Middle East which threatened Western Europe's oil supplies, the UK and perhaps some other NATO countries would probably participate even at risk of involvement in general war. However, if it appeared that both the US and the USSR might become directly engaged in such a situation in any area, the Western European powers would probably make every effort to limit the scope of the conflict, working through the UN and elsewhere to resolve the impasse or local conflict. Nevertheless, if these measures appeared to

³ See NIE 100-6-57, paragraphs 13 and 39.

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fail and an all out conflict between the US and the USSR appeared imminent, the instinctive urge for survival would be immensely strong. If they came to believe that neutrality was feasible, some NATO governments might demand the withdrawal of US forces or take other steps that they believed would keep them out of the war, irrespective of NATO commitments.

47. Threat of imminent war would also pose serious problems to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. As we have stated earlier, the leaders of the USSR and Communist China understand the destructive nature of nuclear war and desire to avoid substantial risks of general war. Although they would attempt to prevent local conflicts from spreading into general war, the

threat of such war would probably not cause them to withdraw from any local conflict or other crisis situation involving immediate threats to the interests they deem vital. Public opinion would probably not be permitted to develop in such a manner as to exercise a direct effect on policy.

48. However, it is not at all certain whether either the USSR or Communist China would commit itself fully to the other in the event war with the West appeared imminent. In particular, Chinese Communist leaders would certainly consider the advantages of avoiding involvement in the event the USSR became involved with the US and NATO over some issue not of direct concern to Communist China.

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APPENDIX A

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PROGRAMS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO FAMILIARIZE THEIR PEOPLES WITH THE
IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WARFARE

Non-Communist

1. Only the governments of Sweden, Norway, and to a lesser degree the UK, among the countries of the non-Communist world have made any systematic effort to familiarize their peoples with the probable effects of nuclear warfare. While nearly all countries in Western Europe have civil defense planning staffs, and some have programs and organizations involving the participation of substantial numbers of the population, little has been done to tackle the problems of the postwar, nuclear age. Lacking an agreed doctrine and the means for effective civil defense in the nuclear era, most governments appear to be placing their main hope in the strategy of deterrence or in neutrality. They feel that large investments in civil defense would be a waste of limited resources and that programs to familiarize the population with the possible efforts of nuclear warfare would only serve to create additional fears and pressures which would complicate the conduct of national policy.

2. *UK.* In the UK, uncertainty within the government over both military and defense policy, lack of resources, public apathy, and concern about possible public reaction has prevented the adoption of any substantial effort to inform the public about nuclear effects. Instruction and training in dealing with nuclear attacks have been given to many members of the large civilian defense corps (which has about 750,000 volunteer members) but a draft "Householder's Handbook" has been withheld from circulation.

3. The Home Secretary is considering proposals for nuclear civil defense, but the White

Paper on Defense issued in April 1957 indicates that no basic decisions have been reached. The program for 1957-1958 is largely a holding operation, to keep the existing civil defense organization in being, to provide for necessary warning equipment and research, and to work on emergency communications and on setting up a fallout warning and monitoring system.

4. *West German.* Although planning on civil defense against both atomic and nonatomic warfare had been in process as early as 1951, limited efforts by the government of West Germany to familiarize its people with the probable effects of nuclear warfare have been undertaken only since the latter half of 1955. At that time after public interest in atomic warfare and civil defense had been at least temporarily increased by NATO military exercises such as "Carte Blanche," draft legislation for the establishment of a three-year Civil Defense Program costing approximately \$300,000,000 was introduced into the National Parliament. To stimulate interest in the program, the German Ministry of Interior in early 1956 instituted a series of public "Civil Air Defense Days" designed to familiarize the population at large with both the effects of nuclear warfare and the possibilities for defense and protection therefrom. Details on the functioning of this program are lacking.

5. Despite such indoctrination efforts, passage of the Civil Defense legislation had not been completed by 1 April 1957, although its enactment into law is expected shortly. The principal road-block has been the failure to obtain agreement on apportionment of the program's cost between the federal and state governments. This inability to reach agree-

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ment in turn reflected both political and public apathy stemming from a general reluctance to think about anything connected with war. An additional impediment was the surprisingly widespread acceptance of a second inference drawn from the "Carte Blanche" exercise, contrary in nature to the effect cited above: that atomic bombs would inevitably be used in any major conflict and that there might be no effective defense against such atomic attack. Hence governments funds should not be wasted on an expensive Civil Defense program or diverted from other uses offering a tangible return, such as housing construction.

6. *France.* The French government has made virtually no effort to familiarize the general public with the probable effects of nuclear warfare. Although the framework of an extensive organization for civil defense exists in the Ministry of the Interior, its efforts have been largely confined to planning and the training of official personnel. An evacuation and dispersal plan for the civilian population was reported near completion in August 1956 but instructions on its implementation have apparently not been released as yet to the public. As far as is known, there have been no civil defense drills with public participation, involving problems of nuclear warfare. The Interior Minister, blaming a lack of funds, admitted in May 1956 that "nothing of importance" had been done regarding measures for protection against nuclear arms. Other items have received higher priority for government attention and financial resources. Another important reason for the lack of publicity given to civil defense is governmental concern that the French public might be alarmed by strong official emphasis on the effects of nuclear warfare.

7. *Italy.* Italy has taken almost no steps to familiarize its people with the probable effects of nuclear warfare. The only information received by the general public has been through articles occasionally published by newspapers and magazines giving accounts of American and British bomb tests, and containing estimates of the destructive powers of the new weapons. Civil defense measures

are almost nonexistent, and the reasons for inaction are in general those found throughout Europe. Government specialists are frankly confused about what can be done to minimize the danger to the populace and are reluctant to waste resources on experimentation. They prefer to let the US pioneer in this field.

8. *Sweden.* Swedish authorities have sponsored extensive programs to familiarize the Swedish people with the probable effects of nuclear warfare, as a part of Sweden's comprehensive defense planning. Most of these programs are carried out by the civil defense organization which employs over 600 full-time officials and in which 900,000 Swedes (out of a total population of 7,250,000) participate. Swedes of both sexes between the ages of 16 and 65 receive 30 hours of training a year and could be conscripted for 60 hours training in civil defense schools. The civil defense program was started during World War II and has concentrated on the construction of air raid shelters, planning the evacuation of population centers, and the training of personnel and stockpiling of essential equipment. Civil defense officials seek to place the latest available information before their personnel and the Swedish people through civil defense courses, periodicals, pamphlets, and booklets. In 1952, civil defense officials issued a booklet, entitled "If War Comes" to every Swedish family (2,500,000 copies were distributed), which besides instructions on other defense matters and attempts to bolster morale, gave information on measures to be taken for protection against atomic attack and its effects and for evacuation from urban centers. One of the eight civil defense corps is trained in gas and radiological protection.

9. Information on the effects of nuclear warfare has also been distributed by other segments of Sweden's national defense organization including the Home Guard (*Hemvarnet*), the privately-sponsored People and Defense (*Folk och Forsvar*), and other private volunteer organizations such as the Red Cross. Swedish authorities have established a special agency to sample public opinion on such matters as knowledge of, and consideration of

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the effectiveness of, civil defense measures and to plan for wartime measures to counter enemy propaganda and bolster national morale.

10. The Swedish people appear to have responded in a constructive manner to the nuclear information and civil defense programs, probably because of a general belief that deep shelters and other measures offered realistic ways of bettering individual and national chances for survival. However, the advent of the more destructive hydrogen bomb has created doubts, even in Sweden as to the value of current civil defense measures and it is possible that the government will begin to limit its information program.

11. *Japan.* Japan's leaders have been unwilling to take the political risks involved in any official dissemination of information about the implications of nuclear war. Moreover, the government appears to share to a considerable degree the popular view that nuclear warfare would have catastrophic results for Japan, beyond any power of Japan to mitigate. Consistent with this view and with the popular revulsion to the thought of war, the government has made public no program for defense against nuclear attack, nor for emergency civil defense measures.

12. In this situation, the Japanese public has been subject to a steady stream of highly emotional, and frequently misleading press accounts of nuclear effects. The tentative, limited action of the government to encourage a more objective and responsible attitude toward the nuclear problem has to date had but little effect.

13. *India.* The Indian government has no civil defense program and no program designed specifically to inform the population about the probable effects of nuclear warfare. However, in the process of furthering its campaign against nuclear tests, the government has published a lengthy document in which Indian scientists outlined the dangers of nuclear blast and their possible genetic effects. Such data together with numerous public and parliamentary speeches by Nehru and other leaders have served to familiarize some portion of the population with the general nature of nuclear effects. The popular reaction has

been one of horror, perhaps because of the manner in which the information has been presented.

Sino-Soviet Bloc

14. *USSR.* The USSR has guardedly released information on nuclear weapons effects to the Soviet public since 1954. The initiation of an information program in 1954 apparently anticipated the beginning of training in atomic civil defense in 1955 and the resulting requirements for greater understanding of nuclear effects. The information program has attempted to avoid any "scare" aspects and until recently has been intended for the military and those active in civil defense rather than for the general public.

15. The dissemination of nuclear effects information has been largely accomplished through specialized military, paramilitary, and civil defense publications. Most information reaches the Soviet public through publications of the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF) and through civil defense manuals and during the course of civil defense instruction. As many as 50 million Soviet citizens may now have received instruction in elementary atomic defense.

16. Although Soviet citizens have been exposed to semi-technical data on nuclear physics, weapons construction, and nuclear effects, much of the data on effects has been given in terms of "nominal" weapons. The articles which have appeared in specialized publications since 1955 to prepare readers for the introduction of defense instruction against fallout have not contained sufficient data to provide a full picture of the possible area or persistency of radioactivity created by the hydrogen bomb.

17. Hydrogen bombs have been described merely as being "more powerful" than ordinary bombs. The Soviet Army newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, carried an article in April 1956 in which the reader was gingerly acquainted with the proposed tactic of evacuating civil defense equipment to shelter areas in the periphery of target centers, but the

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Soviet population has not heard reference to any need or plan for mass evacuations. It would probably take an alert reader, even among the subscribers to specialized publications, to piece these bits of information together and to derive the full implications in terms of a fairly accurate picture of the possible effects of nuclear attack.

18. While limiting the type and detail of information disseminated, the government has taken pains to emphasize that the USSR has good air defense capabilities and that an efficient civil defense will reduce the damage of a nuclear attack.

19. The amount of information concerning the effects of nuclear weapons revealed to the average citizen of the USSR is obviously not determined on the basis of information available because Soviet scientists and leaders unquestionably have rather full information derived from weapons tests. Neither can the average citizen's limited information be attributed to security restrictions. Certainly, far more material on nuclear effects has appeared in overt US publications than has been made available to the Soviet worker. This information could be reprinted in the USSR without disclosing "state secrets." It appears that the release of limited atomic information to the Soviet public is based on "need-to-know" and that the degree of need of certain specific information is determined according to the requirements for participation in a civil defense program already decided upon.

20. Nuclear effects information available to the Soviet public has been closely coupled with the civil defense means available or recommended. Committed so far to a policy of shelter in cities for the general population,

the leaders of the USSR have avoided giving the full picture of weapons effects. The untenability of the cities or the need for heavier shelter has been obscured and the issue of general evacuation and defense against widespread fallout has never been raised publicly.

21. *Communist China.* The Chinese Communist regime has made no effort to familiarize the civilian population with the probable effects of nuclear warfare. Lacking any nuclear capabilities of its own or any effective defense for its populous cities, the regime has attempted to minimize the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, and to assure the population of Soviet superiority in nuclear developments. The Chinese people have been assured that preventive measures to increase personal safety are possible, but only the most elementary civil defense instructions have been issued through mass communication media.

22. The regime's failure to undertake a systematic program of familiarization on nuclear effects probably reflects a desire to minimize the power of the US, and to maintain public faith and confidence in China's strength. Moreover, the regime probably believes that the resources necessary to explain nuclear effects and to undertake the necessary civil defense measures would, in view of the widespread illiteracy, low educational levels and vast expanse of the country, require investments of time, skilled personnel, and materials in such quantities as to seriously affect the entire economic program.

23. Rather than create fears and doubts within Communist China through familiarization measures, the regime apparently tends to count on the deterrent effect of Soviet nuclear capabilities and to concentrate on the development of basic industrial strength.

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